Quests for Truth
(From the lens of Wittgenstein’s Theory of Ordinary Language)
Dedicated to Dr. Enrique “Ike” Oracion, a truth quester par excellence, on his retirement from Silliman University
Ben S. Malayang III
There’s been much talk lately of truth. Truth about corruption. Truth in government. Truth in media.
To Nobel Laureate Maria Ressa, truth is anchored on facts. “Without facts, there’s no truth; without truth, there’s no trust.” And absent trust, she says, we can’t solve problems that haunt us all. Like climate change.
But what’s a fact, and truth? How do facts embody truths? And how do facts and truth create trust?
Looking into these questions would show that quests for truth are not easy walks in the park. They’re more like crawling across minefields of preconceptions, presuppositions, assumptions, power plays, judgements, and how words and language are used to create diverse meanings across groups. If not carefully handled, these could blow up a quest for truth and destroy trust.
What are Facts? To probably most people, a “fact” is a statement that is true. Else, it won’t be a fact. But a statement, by itself, cannot be either true or false. It can only be true or false when people deem it to be or not be an accurate depiction of their experience, ideas, and beliefs. It could be more of one than the others, but often a mix of the three. E.g., the statement “1+1=2” would be true to most people because it “accurately depicts” their shared experience in adding numbers; their shared ideas of “1,” “plus,” “equal to,” and “two”; and their shared belief that all other people have the same experience and ideas as theirs. The same with the statement, “The sun always rises in the east.” It’d be true and deemed a fact by people who share experiences of many times seeing the sun rise in the east; share ideas of “sun,” “rising,” “always,” and “east,” and share a belief that what they’ve been seeing about the sun rising in the east will continue to be so in all days to come. Experience, ideas, and beliefs may be acquired casually or produced by deliberate efforts to craft them like scientific experiments or theorizing, but they serve as basis for determining if a statement is true or false, and is a fact.
Two “Minefields” of Facts. There are two possible difficulties about facts. The first is what would happen if people don’t share details of an experience, idea, or belief? How might they agree on a statement being true or false, and is a fact? And second, what if people differ over the accurateness of how a statement depicts their experience, ideas, or beliefs, whose deeming of the statement to be true or false would matter when determining what are facts?
On “Minefield” 1. Agreeing if a statement is an accurate depiction of experience, ideas, and beliefs would involve people likewise agreeing on the preconceptions, presuppositions, and assumptions behind the statement. For example, “1+1=2” is true to people who assume that they are using a common counting base of 10, which is what most people use when counting and adding numbers. But if the base were, say, 2, “1+1” would not be equal to 2 but to 10. The use of base 10 is a preconception that creates a presupposition of a numbering system using base 10. This then becomes an assumption in deeming “1+1=2” to be true. Non-agreement on either the preconception, presupposition, or assumption would create a disagreement on “1+1=2” being true. The statement “the sun always rises in the east” would be true to people who share a similar preconception of “past,” “present,” and “future” that creates a presupposition of “always” as a repeating linearity of the three. This presupposition becomes an assumption behind the statement. In brief, unshared preconceptions, presuppositions, and assumptions could derail how people agree if a statement is true, and if it is a fact.
On “Minefield” 2. When there’s disagreements on the factuality of a statement, any disagreeing party may hold on to its view and not concede to the others. But in a community of people, this is not often the case. E.g., in a Court of Law, it’d be the Judge (and more Judges when appealed); they have the authority to decide if a statement presented in a case is true or false. In a political system, higher offices and personalities possess power to decide on the factuality of statements made in reports or proceedings. In a religious community, it would be its ecclesiastical authorities. In a classroom, it would be the teacher. In short, power (having authority and influence) would likely create what Dr. Oracion refers to as “positionality”. This could play into whose deeming of a statement to be true or false would prevail.
Unless these two minefields are successfully navigated, it would be difficult for people to agree on whether statements are true or false, or if they are factual.
What is Truth? Truth is a plurality of statements that (a) people could agree that each accurately depicts their shared experiences, ideas, and beliefs despite their ‘minefields’, (b) describe the features, states, and relationships of the things and events that are their subjects of concern, and (c) together create a singular proposition that people agree to be consistent with most other truths they already hold in their realms of consciousness and awareness.
Consciousness is what people have “inside” their minds, like principles, ideals, and values. Awareness is what people see “outside” them, like things and events in their environment. Consistency with already held truths gives a statement “actuality.” Actuality is how a plurality of facts relating to the features, states, and relationships of things and events contained in the statement create a singular proposition that is consistent with already held truths.
Two examples: The statement “1+1=2” is true to people who agree on its preconceptions, presuppositions, and assumptions. It becomes a truth when people agree on (a) each of the many facts about the features, state, and relationships of “1,” “plus,” “equal,” and “2,” and (b) the facts create a singular proposition that is consistent with the other truths they already hold (i.e., it has actuality). Meanwhile, the statement “the sun always rises in the east” is true to people who share its preconceptions, presuppositions, and assumptions. It becomes a truth when they agree on the many facts about the features, state, and relationships of “sun,” “always,” “rising,” and “east,” and see them together as an actuality (or being consistent with other truths they already hold).
However, a truth may go beyond facts. People can be conscious and aware of things and events that may not be entirely bounded by facts (like faith, ethics, feelings, morals, aesthetics, and instincts on how things and events unfold around them). These don’t require others to agree if statements about them are true or false, only that they are what their adherents judge them to be. These judgements could play into how things and events acquire actuality.
Thus, a quest for truth could involve agreeing on (a) several statements being facts, (b) how the facts together create an actuality, and (c) judgements about things and events beyond facts.
Three “Minefields” of Truth. If indeed “fact” and “truth” are as described here, then any quest for truth faces three hazardous “minefields”.
First would be the “minefields” inherent in facts. When viewed against what truths people already hold, the minefields could derail how the same people could agree if the facts purvey an actuality.
Second would be how people process a new truth produced by a quest. They may modify a truth that they already hold in favor of the new truth, or use the former to reject the latter. Or, because of the former, they may hold different preconceptions, presuppositions, assumptions, and judgements on the statements advancing the new truth. Be it prejudice or bias, this complicates how people could agree on a new truth.
And third would be how people use words in language. Using words involves rules and contexts that create its meaning among different users. Ludwig Wittgenstein refers to this as a “Language Game”. E.g., the word “sunrise” may mean to many as “sun rising in the east”. But to Emily Dickenson in her poem A Day, and to those who read her, it could mean anticipation, hope, and resurrection. Or the word “recruitment” would mean differently in the language game of the military (which is to solicit enlistments into the armed services) and the language game of fisheries scientists (which is about natural additions to a fishery population). Different language games across socially heterogenous populations are likely to complicate attempts to pin down agreements on the usage and meaning of words, and on how words create statements that are true and are facts. Differences in language games across groups add to the complications and difficulties for people to agree how a collection of facts and judgements purvey an actuality of things and events (or a truth).
The Matter of Fiction and Fantasy. Further complicating quests for truth are fiction and fantasy. Fiction is about common occurrences, but which had not happened. Fantasy is about uncommon occurrences that could not possibly happen in our existing sense of reality. Both could not be true. But people could agree on a truth from them. In the case of Hans Christian Andersen’s The Emperor’s New Clothes, a fiction, despite not being factual, people see in it a truth that power and conceit could lead to ridiculous irrationality. In George Lucas’ Star Wars, a fantasy, people could agree on a truth about how power without morals destroys and how power with morals creates justice and peace.
When fiction and fantasy populate people’s realms of consciousness and awareness, agreeing on actualities about something like power, conceit, morals, justice, and peace would be an even more difficult thing to do.
Conclusion. Questing for truth is a hallmark of a mature and decent people and society. But because humanity hosts a diversity of senses and ways of seeing the world, agreeing on the truth or falsity of statements and on their actuality would, as Ms. Ressa affirms, build trust. And, with trust, people are better able to work together to advance their individual and collective wellbeing.
But agreeing on the truth or falsity of statements and on their actuality requires hard and careful work to navigate minefields of preconceptions, presuppositions, assumptions, power and positionality, judgements, “language games”, and derivations of truths from fiction and fantasy. It’d be especially more difficult and borders impossibility if people of power and superior positionality would insist on a truth in the interest of imposing an ideology, advancing their self-interest, or sheer demagoguery.
In short, quests for truth – including for the Truth – is certainly not a walk in the park. It takes hard work to create agreements among naturally disagreement-inclined humans. It may be even a dangerous exercise, with trust likely to be its first victim.
But quests for truth must go on. It makes us sane and hopeful about our humanity.
